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Background. First impressions are thought to exert a dis-
proportionate influence on subsequent judgments; how-
ever, their role in medical diagnosis has not been
systematically studied. We aimed to elicit and measure
the association between first impressions and subsequent
diagnoses in common presentations with subtle indica-
tions of cancer. Methods. Ninety UK family physicians
conducted interactive simulated consultations online,
while on the phone with a researcher. They saw 6 patient
cases, 3 of which could be cancers. Each cancer case
included 2 consultations, whereby each patient consulted
again with nonimproving and some new symptoms. After
reading an introduction (patient description and present-
ing problem), physicians could request more information,
which the researcher displayed online. In 2 of the possible
cancers, physicians thought aloud. Two raters coded inde-
pendently the physicians’ first utterances (after reading
the introduction but before requesting more information)
as either acknowledging the possibility of cancer or not.
We measured the association of these first impressions
with the final diagnoses and management decisions. Re-
sults. The raters coded 297 verbalizations with high inter-
rater agreement (Kappa = 0.89). When the possibility of
cancer was initially verbalized, the odds of subsequently
diagnosing it were on average 5 times higher (odds ratio
4.90 [95% CI 2.72 to 8.84], P\ 0.001), while the odds of
appropriate referral doubled (OR 1.98 [1.10 to 3.57], P =
0.002). The number of cancer-related questions physicians
asked mediated the relationship between first impressions
and subsequent diagnosis, explaining 29% of the total
effect. Conclusion. We measured a strong association
between family physicians’ first diagnostic impressions
and subsequent diagnoses and decisions. We suggest
that interventions to influence and support the diagnostic
process should target its early stage of hypothesis genera-
tion. Key words: family medicine; provider decision mak-
ing; cognitive psychology; heuristics and biases. (Med
Decis Making XXXX;XX:xx–xx)
I t is a characteristic of human judgment to formu-late hypotheses quickly.1 Research in social and
cognitive psychology has found a disproportionate
influence of early hypotheses on final judgments.2–6
This has been attributed to the working memory
being less loaded at the start of a judgment task;
therefore, initial information receives more attention
and is better encoded.3 Early impressions can be
maintained and carried through to the final judgment
via biased information search7 and/or biased infor-
mation processing.8 Physicians, too, have been found
to generate hypotheses in the first few seconds of the
clinical encounter and with little information.9 Phy-
sicians’ self-reports suggest an association between
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these early hypotheses and subsequent diagnosis.10,11
Nevertheless, this association has not been systemat-
ically studied and measured in practicing physicians’
diagnostic judgments.
We aimed to elicit and measure this association in
situations of known diagnostic difficulty, namely,
that of family physicians diagnosing commonpresen-
tations with subtle indications of cancer. Family
physicians are tasked with the diagnosis of poten-
tially serious but as yet undifferentiated problems.
Diagnosing cancer is inherently difficult: fewer than
half of all cancer patients present with so-called
‘‘alarm symptoms’’ or ‘‘red flags,’’12–14 which are,
supposedly characteristic features of cancer. Most
such symptoms have generally low positive predic-
tive values.15 Diagnostic delays in cancer can lead
to significant patient harm, as the disease can become
less treatablewith time. Retrospective studies of diag-
nostic errors, using record screening and analysis of
case reports,16 as well as analyses of medicolegal
cases,17 have highlighted cancers as being a common
diagnostic problem thatmay lead to error. Using short
vignettes, 1 study found that family physicians gener-
ated common diagnoses first, before they generated
more serious and less common possibilities.18 We
expect that these initial judgments will exert dispro-
portionate influence on final diagnoses, especially in
the absence of strongly diagnostic information.
METHODS
Materials
We conducted evidence reviews in relation to
symptoms and signs of colorectal cancer, lung cancer,
andmyeloma. On the basis of these, we constructed 3
patient cases in which cancer was a possible diagno-
sis and included sufficient detail so that they could
be employed in an interactive simulated consultation
(example in the supplemental appendix). We also
used 3 cases from a previous study: a man with typi-
cal symptoms of gout, a small child with typical
asthma symptoms, and another small child with
fever.19 These were employed as decoys to prevent
participants from forming an impression that all con-
sultations were about possible cancers but also as
practice cases to get participants used to the method-
ology. Only data from the cancer consultations were
analyzed and are presented.
The patients in the cancer cases were older than 60
y and presented with 1 main, persistent symptom:
constipation for 1 mo (colorectal cancer case), cough
for 6 wk (lung cancer case), and back pain for more
than 2 mo (myeloma case). The symptom could be
explained by a more common, preexisting diagnosis:
irritable bowel syndrome (colorectal cancer case),
exacerbation of chronic obstructive pulmonary dis-
ease (lung cancer case), and mechanical back pain
(myeloma case). There were no ‘‘alarm symptoms,’’
such as rectal bleeding, hemoptysis, or severe weight
loss. All cancer patients (as well as 1 decoy patient)
consulted twice. The second consultation was
described to take place either 2 wk (colorectal and
lung cases) or 6 wk after the first consultation (mye-
loma case). At the second consultation, the main
symptom (cough, constipation, back pain) had not
improved despite any treatment prescribed at the first
consultation. The patients reported new symptoms,
such as increased fatigue and breathlessness, and the
results of some investigations (if ordered) could sug-
gest an abnormality (e.g., slight anemia and inflamma-
tion). The lack of improvement in the patients’ main
symptom, the additional symptoms, and the abnormal
test results constitute information that is incompatible
with themore common competing diagnoses andwar-
rant referral to specialist or referral for specialist inves-
tigations (e.g., colonoscopy, computed tomography
[CT] scan).
Methodologies
We used 2 process-tracing methodologies: active
information search20 and think aloud.21,22 Active
information search involves participants requesting
information in a step-by-step fashion, as they see fit,
rather than being presented with the information all
at once or in a sequence determined by the researcher.
The methodology is well suited for the study of
medical diagnosis, which is interactive and involves
a stepwise search for information. The think aloud
methodology allows researchers some access to covert
thinking processes, such as hypotheses, assumptions,
and inferences.
Procedure
Data collection took place remotely over the
Internet, using a Web tool designed specifically for
the study. Participants were on the phone with
a researcher (M.S.), who operated the site and guided
them through the task during a single session. All par-
ticipants followed the same sequence and consulted
with all the patients (Figure 1). The presentation
order of the noncancer patients was fixed, while
the presentation order of the cancer patients was
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randomized per participant. Participants were asked
to think aloud while diagnosing the last 2 cancer
patients that they encountered, while the first cancer
patient was used as silent control.
At the start of each consultation, all participants
read the same initial information about the patient:
a short description and the presenting problem (Fig-
ure 2). They could then request more information in
relation to history, physical examination, and inves-
tigations (that did not require referral to a specialist).
We had prepared a set of answers to potential ques-
tions for each patient. After each question, the
researcher chose the appropriate answer and dis-
played it on the participant’s screen. If participants
asked questions for which there was no predeter-
mined answer, the researcher typed in the question,
so that it was recorded, and selected appropriately
from a set of generic responses (e.g., ‘‘no,’’ ‘‘normal’’).
When participants wished to finish the consultation,
they were asked to type in their working diagnosis
(‘‘What is your main working diagnosis? Enter only
one’’) and their differential (‘‘If you have any other
differential diagnoses, enter them below’’). They
were then asked to select their management from
a list of options (more than 1 could be selected): pre-
scribe, refer to specialist/for specialist tests, arrange
follow-up, and/or ask patient to come back if symp-
toms persist. The system automatically recorded all
information gathered, time, diagnoses, and manage-
ment decisions.After participants gave their diagnosis
and management at the first consultation, the patient
presented again for a second consultation, unless he
or she had already been referred to a specialist.
When think aloud was required, the researcher
asked participants to read aloud the patient descrip-
tion and presenting problem shown on the screen.
Given our focus on the initial phase of the diagnostic
process, he always prompted them to keep talking
after they had finished reading, unless they did so
spontaneously. The researcher also prompted them
to keep talking at various points during the process
but not after each question, to avoid interfering with
the diagnostic task. The think aloud protocols were
audio recorded and transcribed verbatim.
Sample Size and Recruitment
The cases differedwidely in their content.We thus
assumed independence of responses within partici-
pants, as observed in our previous studies in which
family physicians diagnosed a range of different
patient cases.19,23 Using the software G*Power 3.1,
we estimated that in a 2-tailed logistic regression
with a binary predictor, a conservative expected
effect size (odds ratio of 2), 50% probability of the
null hypothesis, 5% probability of type I error, and
80%power, 270 responses (90 physicians diagnosing
3patients)would be sufficient to detect a relationship
between initial hypotheses and final diagnosis.
We invited family physicians from London and
southwest England to participate in ‘‘a study of
Figure 1 The sequence followed by all participants in the study.
The presentation order of the cancer patients was randomized,
while that of the decoy patients was fixed.
Figure 2 The initial information that all participants read: patient
description and presenting problem (example from the colorectal
cancer case).
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clinical reasoning’’ and did not mention cancer. We
recruited participants either by e-mailing family
physicians, who had taken part in other studies by
our group, or via local clinical research networks.
Recruitment continued until the required sample
size was achieved. Participants received recompense
for an estimated 3-h involvement at standard clinical
rates. Data were collected between October 2013 and
November 2014.
Analyses
The main outcome measure was whether the phy-
sician recorded a cancer diagnosis at the end of each
consultation, either as theworking diagnosis or in the
differential. We coded this as either 1 (cancer diag-
nosed) or 0 (cancer not diagnosed). Management
was coded as either 1 (appropriate referral) or 0 (no/
inappropriate referral). We coded as 1 all referrals to
the appropriate specialist: colorectal surgeon, gastro-
enterologist, and gastrointestinal team in the colorec-
tal cancer case; respiratory or chest physician in the
lung cancer case; and hematologist, rheumatologist,
oncologist, and orthopedics in the myeloma case.
We also coded as 1 all referrals for appropriate inves-
tigations: colonoscopy and sigmoidoscopy in the
colorectal cancer case, CT scan and bronchoscopy
in the lung cancer case, and magnetic resonance
imaging and bone scan in themyeloma case. Referrals
to the appropriate specialist were either for suspected
cancer or for further investigations. Referrals to a dif-
ferent specialist for non–cancer-related reasons (e.g.,
to a cardiologist for echocardiogram, to a smoking
cessation clinic, or for pulmonary physiotherapy) as
well as no referrals were scored as 0.
We coded participants’ questions (both those that
the system recorded automatically, i.e., questions
with a predetermined answer, and those that the
researcher had typed in) as either cancer related or
not. Cancer-related questions were those that could
provide some evidence for cancer, irrespective of
the patient’s answer, based on the agreement of the
3 clinical authors (T.R., S.S., B.C.D.). For example,
asking about blood in sputum, tiredness, appetite,
and weight loss were all coded as cancer-related,
although they differ in the strength of evidence that
they can provide.
In the think aloud protocols, we singled out the
participants’ initial utterances, after they read the ini-
tial patient description and presenting problem (Fig-
ure 2) and before asking further questions. Two raters
(O.K. and B.C.D.) coded these utterances indepen-
dently as either 1 (cancer mentioned) or 0 (cancer
not mentioned). After agreement of the clinical
authors, we also coded as 1 instances in which
participants did not mention cancer but mentioned
‘‘malignancy,’’ ‘‘tumor,’’ ‘‘carcinoma,’’ ‘‘neoplasm,’’
‘‘something sinister,’’ and ‘‘red flags’’ (red flags
were thought to refer to cancer only in the colorectal
and lung cases; in myeloma, red flags could refer also
to other conditions, such as central disc prolapse). A
third coding categorywas used for instances inwhich
verbalization was not sufficient to enable coding of 1
or 0. We used logistic regressions to explore the rela-
tionship between initial utterances (‘‘first impres-
sions’’) and subsequent diagnoses and decisions. To
test whether this relationshipwas explained by infor-
mation search, we constructed a simple mediation
model with the number of cancer-related questions
as the mediator.
To ensure that the assumption of independence of
responses within participants held, we repeated all
the analyses as 2-level logistic regression models
with random intercept and patient/consultation as
a repeated measure. We also checked for any influen-
ces of thinking aloud by comparing performance on
the consultations in which participants thought
aloud (i.e., in the last 2 cancer cases encountered)
with that on the consultations without thinking
aloud (i.e., in the first cancer case encountered,
used as silent control). We expected increased time
but no differences in diagnoses and decisions.
STATA 13.1 was used in all the analyses.
RESULTS
We recruited 90 family physicians: 50 were men
(55.6%) and had an average experience of 12 y in fam-
ily medicine (s = 8.8, median = 10, range = 0–36 y).
Across patients and consultations, cancer was diag-
nosed on 51% of occasions. On 22.5% of occasions,
cancer was the working diagnosis. Appropriate refer-
rals were made on 42% of occasions (Table 1). As
expected, thinking aloud significantly increased the
time taken (x = 8.33 min v. 7.02 min for think aloud
v. silent consultations, respectively; beta 1.31 [95%
CI 0.61 to 2.00], P\ 0.001) but had no influence on
the outcome measures (diagnosis and referral). The
simple and the 2-level logistic regressionmodels pro-
duced almost identical results, validating our
assumption of independence of responses. Below,
we report results from the simple regression models.
There was a strong association between cancer
diagnosis and appropriate referral: odds ratio (OR)
9.01 [5.78 to 14.04], P\0.001. A significant increase
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in appropriate referrals was observed at the second
patient consultation: OR 2.66 [1.79 to 3.95], P \
0.001. In contrast, there was no significant increase
in cancer diagnoses at the second consultation: OR
1.16 [0.79 to 1.70]. This suggests that a second consul-
tation had an independent effect on referral, unre-
lated to the diagnosis. This was confirmed in
a regressionmodel with both diagnosis and consulta-
tion as predictors of referrals: diagnosis OR 10.29
[6.41 to 16.54] and consultation OR 3.39 [2.11 to
5.45], both at P\ 0.001.
We coded 297 instances of initial verbalizations:
180 at first consultation (90 physicians thinking
aloud on 2 cancer cases) and 117 at second
consultation—therewere fewer second consultations
because, on 63 think aloud occasions, physicians had
referred the patient at the first consultation. Interrater
agreement was very high: colorectal cancer case
Kappa 0.88, lung cancer case Kappa 0.90, and mye-
loma case Kappa 0.87, with an overall Kappa of
0.89. Discrepancies were resolved by discussion.
There were 85 instances of insufficient verbalization,
in which participants talked about what questions
they wanted to ask the patient and what investiga-
tions they were going to order, but they did not
explain ‘‘why’’ in diagnostic terms. These 85 instan-
ces were dropped from further analysis, which left
212 instances of first impressions: 108 instances
where cancer was initially mentioned (51%) and
104 instances where it was not (49%). When cancer
was initially mentioned, it was subsequently diag-
nosed in 62% of the consultations (67/108); when it
was not initially mentioned, it was diagnosed in
only 25% of the consultations (26/104). First impres-
sions were strongly associated with subsequent diag-
nosis: when cancer was initiallymentioned, the odds
of a cancer diagnosis were on average 5 times higher
than when it was not initially mentioned (OR 4.90
[2.72 to 8.84], P\ 0.001). The odds of appropriate
referral were doubledwhen cancer was initiallymen-
tioned (OR 1.98 [1.10 to 3.57], P = 0.002).
In 60% of the instances of insufficient verbaliza-
tion (51/85), cancer was diagnosed in the end. We
performed sensitivity analyses using all 297 instan-
ces of initial verbalization, including the 85 instances
of insufficient verbalization that had been dropped
from the analyses above. First, we coded all 85 instan-
ces as 1 (cancer mentioned), which resulted in 65%
(193/297) of verbalization instances where cancer was
mentioned. This did not alter the relationship between
first impressions and diagnosis (OR 4.74 [2.78 to 8.02],
P\0.001).Whenwecoded the85 instancesas0 (cancer
not mentioned), this resulted in 36% (108/297) of ver-
balization instances where cancer was mentioned.
The strength of the relationship between first impres-
sions and diagnosis was reduced but remained signifi-
cant: OR 2.38 [1.43 to 3.86], P\ 0.001.
We detected some associations with physician
experience. Specifically, physicians with more years
in familymedicinewere less likely tomention cancer
at the start (OR 0.96 [0.93 to 0.99], P = 0.008) and give
it later as their working diagnosis (OR 0.97 [0.95 to
0.99], P = 0.018). The association with the inclusive
measure of diagnosis (cancer as working or in differ-
ential) was borderline (OR 0.98 [0.96 to 1.00], P =
0.051), whereas no association between experience
and appropriate referral was found (OR 0.99 [097 to
1.01]). As the study was not designed and powered
to detect experience-related differences, these associ-
ations should be interpreted with caution.
The number of cancer-related questions mediated
the relationship between first impressions and
Table 1 Cancer Diagnosis Frequency, No. (%)










Colorectal Working/differential 54 (60) 32 (36) 90 42 (72) 39 (67) 58
Working 18 (20) 21 (36)
Lung Working/differential 28 (31) 9 (10) 90 23 (30) 33 (43) 76
Working 0 5 (7)
Myeloma Working/differential 51 (57) 49 (54) 90 25 (69) 25 (69) 36
Working 37 (41) 18 (50)
Total Working/differential 133 (49) 90 (33) 270 90 (53) 97 (57) 170
Working 55 (20) 44 (26)
Note: Cancer diagnoses (working or in differential, and working only) and appropriate referrals by simulated patient and consultation. Working diagnoses
of cancer were always followed by appropriate referral.
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diagnosis (Figure 3). The standardized regression
coefficients both between first impressions and can-
cer-related questions (2.76 [1.80 to 3.72]) and
between cancer-related questions and final diagnosis
(0.17 [0.08 to 0.26]) were significant. The standard-
ized indirect effect was (2.76)*(0.17) = 0.47 [0.22 to
0.81] (confidence intervals estimated using boot-
strapping with 10,000 samples) and explained 29%
of the total effect (0.47/1.59). No associations were
found between either first impressions or diagnosis
with noncancer questions.
DISCUSSION
Using process-tracing methodologies, we elicited
and measured a strong association between family
physicians’ first diagnostic impressions, as evident
from their concurrent verbalizations, and their subse-
quent diagnosis and referral decisions in common
presentations with subtle indications of cancer. Par-
ticipants who, after reading a brief description about
the patient and the presenting problem, and before
requesting more information, did not explicitly
acknowledge cancer as a diagnostic possibility were
considerably less likely to diagnose it later and to
refer the patient appropriately. A second presenta-
tion of the nonimproving patient increased the odds
of appropriate referral but not of diagnosis. It is possi-
ble that considerations, such as patient satisfaction
and regret avoidance, affect only referral decisions
without influencing diagnosis.
When cancer was acknowledged explicitly as
a possibility at the start of a consultation, it led to
more cancer-related questions asked. This suggests
that an initial concern about a possible cancer drove
physicians to ask more questions about it, which
enabled them to build a picture of cancer as a viable
hypothesis and manage the patients accordingly. It
is also likely that first impressions influenced the
interpretation of the information subsequently gath-
ered. The patients did not present with alarm symp-
toms for cancer but with subtle ones. If cancer was
not considered at the start, symptoms such as fatigue
or borderline anemia could well be dismissed or nor-
malized.24,25 Theweak, negative association between
physician experience and first impressions deserves
further study, as it can have implications for medical
education.
We took great care to minimize the likelihood that
participants would perceive this as a cancer-related
study, which would influence the behavior of inter-
est: we included as many noncancer cases as cancer
cases; 1 noncancer case included 2 consultations,
like the cancer cases; and we asked participants to
think aloud during that noncancer case, too. Our
clinical cases were rich in detail and contained both
diagnostically relevant and irrelevant information,
meticulously developed to satisfy participants’ infor-
mation requests. This type of simulated interactive
consultation on computer, where answers to physi-
cians’ questions are provided in real time, has been
used in previous studies by the first author19,26,27
and is the closest to a clinical consultation, short of
using standardized patients. Nevertheless, there
may still be a concern that medical scenarios pre-
sented in written form do not sufficiently represent
real-life clinical encounters. Written scenarios used
to study medical decision making intend to elicit
and measure aspects of the decision-making pro-
cesses that physicians use in real life. The elicited
behaviors should not be taken as a reflection of real-
life behavior ‘‘but rather as strong predictors or prox-
ies for such behavior.’’28 There is now substantial evi-
dence that clinicians behave similarly both inwritten
scenarios and approximate real-life situations.28
We employed the think aloudmethodology to gain
access to participants’ initial hypotheses without
having to ask them directly, as this would likely
change their usual way of dealing with the cases. By
using one cancer case as silent control (i.e., diagnosed
without thinking aloud), we also ascertained that the
think aloud methodology did not interfere with the
outcomemeasures (diagnosis and decision) in a mea-
surable way. Nevertheless, thinking aloud cannot
reveal the entire contents of a participant’s working
memory; it is possible that some participants consid-
ered cancer as a possibility at the start but did not
verbalize this. The sensitivity analyses that we per-
formed by including instances of insufficient ver-
balization in the analyses go some way to tackle this
limitation of concurrent verbal data, as they
Figure 3 Mediation model and standardized regression coeffi-
cients for the relationship between first impressions and final can-
cer diagnosis as mediated by the number of cancer-related
questions.
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demonstrate the strength of the relationship between
initial verbalizations and final diagnoses. Whether
physicians did not elicit the cancer hypothesis at
the start or elicited it but considered it unlikely, the
fact remains that they explored it less extensively
than those who explicitly acknowledged it as
a possibility.
The weak mediation effect of information search
(number of cancer-related questions) suggests that
a sizeable portion of the influence of initial impres-
sions on final diagnosis is likely also to be mediated
by the biased interpretation of information subse-
quently encountered. Because of incomplete verbal-
izations (participants were not prompted for their
thoughts after each question), the concurrent verbal
protocols from this study cannot be used for a system-
atic and unbiased exploration of information interpre-
tation following first impressions. There is, however,
substantial evidence for predecisional information
distortion in the literature,29,30 which suggests that,
as a judgment, hypothesis or preference emerges,
information gets distorted to support it (either bol-
stered or denigrated or both),31–33 and that this hap-
pens with not only ambiguous but also diagnostic
information.34,35 In a series of experiments ondiagnos-
tic reasoning, in which students were taught the prob-
abilistic relationships between fictitious chemicals
and resultinghealth symptomsandwere subsequently
asked to identify the chemical that had caused the pre-
senting symptoms, Rebitschek and colleagues36 found
a strong primacy effect: once an initial, leading
hypothesis was established, it determined the final
diagnosis, even in cases inwhich subsequent informa-
tion was inconsistent. The authors attributed their
findings to information distortion: participants
changed the subjective value of the sequentially pre-
sented information to maintain coherence with their
initial hypothesis, a phenomenon also supported by
a number of other studies.37–40
Our study adds to the literature on first impres-
sions, specifically in the area of diagnostic reasoning,
using physicians as study participants diagnosing
detailed clinical cases in an interactive manner that
reflects real-life consultations. The study also estab-
lishes early diagnostic impressions as one reason
for diagnostic delay in cases of possible cancers pre-
senting with subtle symptoms and no red flags. Our
findings suggest that attempts to reduce diagnostic
delays should target the earliest stages of the diagnos-
tic process. Hogarth41 advises us to be critical of first
impressions and to ask ourselves why our first idea
might be wrong. Larrick42 suggests considering the
opposite, as a way of avoiding confirmation bias
and reducing overconfidence. Rebitschek and col-
leagues36 found a reduction of the primacy effect
when participants assessed each symptom in relation
to each competing, potential cause. Educators could
consider how such strategies can be formally and sys-
tematically introduced to the medical curricula.
Nevertheless, people who make decisions under
time pressure, are multitasking, or are faced with too
muchandpoorly structured information are less likely
to question their first impressions. External decision
aids may be more effective in such pressured and
busy working environments. In 2 recent randomized
controlled trials in the United Kingdom and Greece,
using the samemethodology for presenting themateri-
als as in this study, physicians who simply read on
their screen a list of differential diagnoses at the start
of their interactive consultation with a computerized
patient, and before gathering any further information
(i.e., at the exact stage where we elicited first impres-
sions in this study), were more accurate than controls
across a range of diagnostic difficulty.26,27 These 2 tri-
als, conducted in 2 different countries with different
medical training and health care systems, suggested
that simple, external aids aimed at the initial stage of
hypotheses generation can successfully influence first
impressions and reduce diagnostic error.
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